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Fiscal policy in the 1920s and 1930s 
How much different it is from the post war period’s 
policies? 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 15/2005 
Matti Virén 




This paper deals with the fiscal behaviour of governments in the 1920s and 1930s. 
The intention is to see whether there were the same features in government 
behaviour as in the post-World War II era. In particular, attention is paid to 
asymmetric fiscal policies, ie the question of whether government deficits react 
differently to income growth and inflation during depressions and booms. The 
analysis is carried out using data primarily from the League of Nations. The data 
come from 32 countries and covers the period 1925–1938. Estimation results 
suggest the in pre-war period deficits were much less sensitive to output and did 
not show as many asymmetric features as in post-war period. Otherwise, the same 
regularities apply to the empirical results. In particular, this is true with the 
disciplinary role of government debt in terms of budget deficits. 
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Finanssipolitiikka 1920- ja 1930-luvulla: 
Miten paljon se poikkesi sotien jälkeisen ajanjakson 
politiikasta? 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 15/2005 
Matti Virén 




Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan 1920- ja 1930-luvun finanssipolitiikkaa. Tar-
koitus on selvittää, missä määrin valtioiden toiminta oli samanlaista kuin toisen 
maailmansodan jälkeisenä aikana. Erityisen mielenkiinnon kohteena on mahdolli-
nen finanssipolitiikan epäsymmetrisyys eli kysymys siitä, reagoivatko ali- ja 
ylijäämät eri tavalla tulojen kasvuun laman aikana ja korkeasuhdanteissa. 
Analyysit tehdään käyttäen lähinnä Kansainliiton tilastoja. Aikasarja-aineistoa on 
32 maasta, ja se kattaa ajanjakson 1925–1938. Estimointitulokset viittaavat siihen, 
että toista maailmansotaa edeltävänä ajanjaksona alijäämät olivat vähemmän 
sensitiivisiä tuotannon suhteen, eivätkä yhtä voimakkaasti epäsymmetrisiä kuin 
sotien jälkeisenä akanjaksona. Muutoin tuloksiin pätevät samat lainalaisuudet, ja 
tämä koskee erityisesti velkaantuneisuuden rajoittavaa vaikutusta alijäämiin. 
 
Avainsanat: finanssipolitiikka, alijäämä, ei-symmetrinen käyttäytyminen 
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Very little is known of fiscal policy in the 1920s and 1930s. Empirical analyses 
have typically focussed on monetary policy – more precisely, monetary policy 
failures during the Great Depression. The fact that less attention has been paid to 
fiscal policy can be explained by the fact that during the per war period 
governments were much smaller and the importance of fiscal variables was 
consequently much smaller. 
  Moreover, fiscal policies cannot so easily be characterized by any systematic 
policy rules or behavioural patterns which complicates all efforts to model and 
measure policy behaviour. Finally, there are severe data problems. At that time, 
there were no national accounts and even now one may only get data from central 
governments only. Even then, there can be severe data problems due to 
complicated budgetary practices in terms of different intra-governmental income 
transfers and unconsolidated funds. In the 1920s and 1930 there was no OECD or 
IMF to collect comparable data from different countries: only the League of 
Nations collected some data and published them in the Yearbook of League of 
Nations. That is also the main data source in this paper. 
  We do not intend to carry out any extensive analysis on fiscal polices for this 
period. Instead, we only want to make a preliminary assessment on the main 
features of polices compared to post World War 2 experiences. Thus, we want to 
see whether polices were strongly sensitive to cyclical movements. In addition we 
want to see whether the behaviour of government finances (deficits) showed any 
asymmetric features which seem to be present in the post-war period (see eg 
Virén (2000) and Melitz (1997)). 
  In order to be able to interpret the results we also focus on government 
revenues (Rev) and expenditures (EXP) separately. The purpose is simply to see 
to what extent the cyclical behaviour of these variables is different and whether 
the difference can be explained by any rule. 
  The economic analysis boils down in estimating the following simple ‘deficit 
equation’ 
 
u Y / Def y Y / Def 1 2 1 0 + α + ∆ α + α = −  (1.1) 
 
where Def denotes central government surplus (negative values deficit), Y* trend 
Gross Domestic product at current market prices, ∆y output growth, ∆p inflation, 
Def/Y-1 lagged surplus/DDP ratio and u the error term. 
  This commonly estimates equation can be rationalized by the following 
simple set of revenue and expenditure equations: Rev = γY, Exp = θY, Y = Y* + 
Z, where Z is the (nominal) output gap. Then (Rev-Exp)/Y* = Def/Y* = (γY* + 
γZ – θY* – θZ)/Y* = π0 + π1(Z/Y*) = π0 + π1z. Clearly, this specification assumes  
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linear tax rates and linear government expenditure income relationships. If, 
however, the relationships were more complicated (for instance, with nonzero 
origins) the conventional formula Def/Y* = a + bz ≈ a + b∆y could not be derived. 
If the revenue and expenditure equations were nonlinear, the same conclusion 
would obviously hold. The simplest alternative is perhaps a log linear model of 
the type Rev/P = (Y/P)
γ and Exp/P = (Y/P)
θ. Here one could assume that (at least 
in the medium run) γ > 1  and  θ  <  1, that is, due to progressive taxation 
government returns increase with increasing income while government 
expenditures may fail to follow income growth (at least, in the short and medium 
run). With the deficit variable we cannot use this kind model in estimation simply 
because nonnegative deficit values do not allow for log transformation. With 
separate revenue and expenditure equations (Tables 4 and 5) this is possible, 
however, and the respective results can be interpreted from this point of view. 
  With the deficit variable we can, however, estimate a non-linear model to 
account for cyclical asymmetries but with kind of model we cannot trace back the 
different revenue and expenditure effects (parameters of the underlying model). 
The model which we use here is a nonlinear threshold model form which can be 
expressed in the following way (for earlier applications, see eg Virén (2001) and 
Mayes and Virén (2005)) 
 
u Y / Def 0 z y 0 z y Y / Def 1 2 12 11 0 + α + > ∆ α + < ∆ α + α = −  (1.2) 
 
In the model, output gap (in terms of real GDP) is used as the threshold variable 
and zero as the threshold. Obviously that does not need to be the case. In this 
study the value can be defended by the following arguments: First of all, the 
sample period for individual countries is very short which does not really allow 
for a genuine search for more precise threshold parameter value. The second 
reason is a need for comparison: the value of zero makes cross-country 
comparisons quite straightforward. Finally, the value of zero has an intuitively 
obvious interpretation. 
  In addition to (1.1) and (1.2) we estimate an extended deficit equation which 
takes the following form 
 




1 3 2 1 0 + + + ∆ + ∆ + = − −  (1.3) 
 
where ∆p denotes inflation and Debt/Y the debt/GDP ratio. The basic idea in 
estimating (1.3) is to see whether the debt level has any disciplinary (or, ‘error-
correction’) effect on current deficits. The role of inflation is obvious from the 
seigniorage point of view but it is not clear how it shows up in the estimated 
deficit equations. That in turn depends on the way the seigniorage revenue is 
reported in the revenue statistics (ie, how the profits of the Central Banks are  
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transferred to the government). Our deficit measures are quite crude and we 
cannot really properly control the seigniorage proceedings and thus exactly 
anticipate the sign of the inflation effect. 
  The role of inflation is not, of course, limited to seigniorage. Obviously 
inflation may affect both revenues and expenditure via various indexation 
schemes. Or even more it may affect these things via the absence of indexation. A 
typical example is progressive taxation. In the absence of proper indexation, 
higher inflation implies higher effective tax rates and higher tax revenues. It is 
only that in the 1920s and 1930s the tax rates were so low that this tax progression 
effect was probably of minor importance. Moreover, the average inflation 
(deflation) rate for the 1920s and 1930s was just zero (see Table 1) which means 
that the role of inflation completely different from, say, the 1970s. 
  All models are estimated using panel data and the reported values correspond 
to cases in which all parameters (except for the fixed time and country effects) are 
constrained to be equal. The panel is incomplete to such extent that in the case of 
fixed effects only the LS or the GLS estimators are feasible. Before presenting the 
estimations results we briefly review the data and scrutinize some descriptive 
statistics and graphs (in section 2). 
 
 
2  The data and some descriptive statistics 
The analyses are based on cross country data on 26 countries that are listed in 
Table 2. In addition, we have six countries with somewhat deficient data 
(Czechoslovakia, Estonia, India, Latvia, Poland and Romania) that are analysed 
separately (see Table 5). The full sample period is 1920–1944 which obviously 
include World War II years for most countries
1. War years are not the only 
abnormal times for the 1920s and 1930s. In the early 1920s there were still some 
unrest, or even war, in Eastern Europe and after 1933, a build-up for the following 
war began. There was a civil war in Spain for 1936–1939, war between Italy and 
Abyssinia in 1936 and war between Japan and China from 1935 on, just to 
mention the biggest crises during that period. In the early 1920s also data 
compilation was quite deficient so that for instance the League of Nations’ 
Yearbook starts to have complete data first from 1925 on. Because of all these 
problems, we have used in addition to the long sample period 1920–1944 a short 
sample period 1925–1938 for which have derived a more or less complete data. 
This period is also the main sample period in empirical analyses. 
                                                 
1 The League of Nations continued publishing the Yearbook until 1944 although many countries 
which were involved in the war stopped providing the data. Thus, the data for 1939–1944 is quite 
deficient already in terms of the country coverage. The quality of the data is then another problem.  
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  Some comments of the main variables merit note. Take the deficit variables 
first. We use two measures Cdef and Gdef. Cdef denotes the current deficit and it 
is derived from the League of Nations Statistical Yearbooks as the difference 
between current revenues and current expenditures. Thus, the measure does not 
include capital expenditures, nor does it include capital revenues (nor, of course, 
borrowing and amortizations). Thus, the measure roughly corresponds to some 
‘current (cash) deficit’. The Gross deficit concept Gdef is simply the difference 
between total expenditures and tax revenues is it is derived from Mitchell 
(2003,ac,c). Roughly, the measure corresponds to ‘net lending’ but because we do 
not know the exact details of expenditures, we cannot really say how close to this 
concept we come. 
  As for output, we have three variables. GDP at constant market prices, gdp,  
(and the corresponding change rate, g), output gap, z, and industrial production, 
ip. Output gap is constructed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with conventional 
weight parameters. 
  Some descriptive data for individual countries are presented in Table 1 while 
Figures 1–10 illustrate the median values of different time-series over 1920–1944. 
The corresponding median deficit and debt ratios are illustrated in Figure 2 and 3, 
the corresponding GDP growth relationships in Figures 3 and 4, the output 
measures in figures 5–6, revenues and expenditure in figure 7, and finally, interest 
rates, the price level and inflation in figures 8–10. 
  Looking at Table 1 and Figures 1–10 one may argue that during the pre-war 
period country differences were much larger that what they are now. Thus, we 
have some very indebted countries (France, UK), some countries which had 
wiped out almost all debt (Finland, Germany) and a miscellaneous set of 
‘reasonably’ indebted countries. Deficit rate show even more variability – 
especially if the time pattern of deficits is taken into account. For some countries 
deficits are inherited from the early 1920, for some countries they reflect the Great 
Depression but there are also countries which have financed their pre-war 
armament programs by having growing government deficits. 
  Differences in growth rates and inflation look much larger than for the most 
post-war periods. These differences reflect many different facts such as initial 
situation in the early 1920s, different economic polices (exchange rate 
arrangements, in particular), pre-war (World War II) militarization and so on. The 
nature of differences also reflect the fact that international trade was much smaller 
than nowadays so that spill-over effects of growth were much smaller making the 




3  Interpretation of results 
Turn now to the estimation results. These are reported in Tables 2–6. Table 2 
contains the basic estimates of the deficit equations (2) and (3) while Table 3 
contains some a bit more sophisticated estimates for equation (3). Finally, the 
estimates for government revenue and expenditure equations are presented in 
Tables 4 and 5. A brief comparison of pre-war and post-war estimates is presented 
in Table 6. In Table 7 we present a set of estimates for the small sub-sample of 
countries. Finally, Table 8 contains just one set of estimates for a simple Fisher 
equation and a (New Keynesian ‘hybrid’) Phillips curve. These estimates are 
produced just to illustrate the basic features of the other relevant macroeconomic 
variables. 
  As for the deficit behaviour, we may summarize the finding in the following 
way: 
 
–  Deficits are sensitive to output but much less than during the post-war period 
in general or just the last decades (Table 2 & 3 & 7) 
–  Deficits are only weakly sensitive to inflation. (Table 2) 
–  There are asymmetric features in output responses; they are of the same 
nature as more recently but in statistical sense they are much weaker 
(Table 2). 
–  Thus the cyclical output (growth) effect on deficits is stronger in good times 
than in bad times (Table 2). 
–  Deficits respond ‘correctly’ to increased debt (higher debt levels tend to 
prevent excessive deficits; (Table 3) 
–  The deficits measures which we have do not allow for distinguishing a 
significant interest rate effect. 
–  The results see to be quite robust in terms of different estimators (Table 2) 
and even for the sample periods. In fact, it is somewhat surprising that the 
results for the long sample period (including the war years) come so close to 
the results for the ‘normal years’.
2 
 
As for revenues and expenditure, the following comments merit note: 
 
–  The income elasticity of government expenditures is less than one while the 
elasticity of revenues is above one. Similarly, the expenditure/GDP ratio is 
not sensitive to income growth while the revue/GDP ratio is clearly 
(positively) related to income growth. (Table 4 & 5) 
                                                 
2 Perhaps the only abnormal feature in the result deals the expenditure/GDP and revenue/GDP 
ratio equations in which the coefficient of the lagged terms goes to unity.  
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–  The results can also be interpreted as suggesting that government 
expenditures behave in contra-cyclical manner while the behaviour of 
revenues is pro-cyclical (Table 5) 
–  In bad times, the negative cyclical (output growth) effect is somewhat more 
important in good (increasing output) times (Table 5) 
 
The fact that deficits were much less sensitive to output than during the last two or 
three decades is really no surprise. The size of government was much smaller. The 
share of taxes of GDP was just a bit above ten percent (see Figure 7). Therefore it 
is no surprise that the output growth coefficient remains at the level which varies 
between 0.05 and 0.10. It is much less that the current estimates for which a 
representative number is something like 0.25 (see eg Virén (2001) and Tujula 
(2004)).
3 
  Even if the sensitiveness has decreased, the basic features of expenditures, 
revenues and deficits have remained the same. That can be seen by comparing 
some basic parameter values for the periods of 1925–1938 and 1971–2004 (table 
6). Thus, the income elasticity of expenditures is in both cases clearly smaller than 
the income elasticity of revenues (with the post-war data, the latter elasticity does 
not exceed one). 
  Although there are signs of asymmetries in all equations, it is not all clear 
how these asymmetries can be explained. The cyclical movements of the 
government revenues and expenditures are different. That is clear and that can 
explain why there are asymmetric features in cyclical movements in government 
deficits. The movements seem to be more sensitive output in depressions than in 
booms but the difference is not enormously clear and robust over all measures and 
estimations methods. Government expenditures and revenues seem also react 
output growth somewhat differently over the business cycle. Thus in good times, 
in particular, acceleration of growth seems to lead to reductions in both 
expenditures and revenues. The two effects largely net out but still the effect on 
government surplus is positive because changes in expenditures dominate the 
outcome
4. 
  Why the estimation of the inflation effect is so difficult was already discussed 
in the introduction. The results in Table 3 suggest the inflation effect is indeed 
quite sensitive to the deficit measure. Thus, the gross deficit it appears to negative 
(although very weak) while with the current deficit the effect is positive. Another 
explanation for the sensitivity of results becomes obvious when we scrutinize the 
                                                 
3 The low value of the government size variables is partly due to the fact the out numbers just 
cover the central, government. 
4 When comparing the cyclical sensitiveness very much depends on whether we focus on the 
absolute levels of expenditures or the corresponding GDP ratios. Similarly, it makes a lot of 
difference whether we analyze the effects of a change of the level of output or a change in the rate 
of change of output (take for instance, the seemingly different results in Tables 4 and 5).  
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time series of output and inflation (see eg Figure 9 and the Phillips curve 
estimates in Table 8). Inflation (or rather deflation) and output growth seem to 
follow each other very closely and it then very difficult to distinguish the income 
and inflation effects. 
  Several other caveats remain with the results due to the data problems
5. Take 
for instance, the problem of interest expenses. Increase in government debt level 
generates more interest expenses and that automatically increase deficits 
offsetting partly or totally the possible ‘disciplinary effects’ of higher government 
indebtedness. If we had precise data on primary deficits we could distinguish both 
effects and assess their relative importance. Unfortunately, that is not the case and 
hence we can only make some very preliminary conclusions. 
  The analyses just focus on the GDP effects on government deficits. 
Obviously, this not the whole story: deficits (government revenues and 
expenditures) affect output and other macro variables. Thus it is a bit dangerous to 
interpret the values of the estimated automatic stabilisers only as reflections of the 
size of the tax and expenditure parameters.
6 
  Anyway, see again signs of nonlinear cyclical response in the sense that 
deficits are much more sensitive in depressions than in booms. In the 1920s and 
1930s that can be simply explained by the growth unemployment related 
expenditures during the repression years. 
  Notice that there seems to be some evidence that interest rates in the 1920s 
and 1930s have behaved somewhat differently from the post-war (WW2) period 
(see eg Figure 8 and estimates of a Fisher equation in Table 7). The main 
difference deals with the role inflation. The effect of inflation on interest rates is 
even negative and definitely different from unity. This is basically no surprise 
because the price level has been almost stationary. Even so, interest rates have 
increased along with higher deficits while better performance (higher GDP) of the 
economy has in fact lowered the rates. 
  The interest rates deficit relationships for the 1920s and 1930s can be 
interpreted in many ways but one has to keep mind that on the level of short rates 
interest rate movements were dictated by exchange rate considerations and (later) 
by the Great Depression. The idea that that there had been some monetary policy 
reactions to the fiscal situation (or vice versa), as proposed by Melitz (1997) for 
                                                 
5 The fact that the parameter estimates are often relative unprecise makes all assessments a bit 
tedious especially because almost all models suffer from autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
Even if the standard errors have been corrected, one cannot really be sure on the exact magnitude 
of the confidence bounds. 
6 An alternative explanation for seemingly weak deficit output relationship is successful policy. If 
policy makers had pursued an effective and successful countercyclical fiscal policy it might well 
look that there is not relationship between output and deficits. See Blinder and Solow (1973) for 
details of this well-known old result.  
14 
the pre Maastricht period, is not consistent with any narrative evidence, nor does 
the data support the idea.
7 
  Although the ‘Fisher equation’ results suggest that it has been difficult to 
predict future inflation we find that the New Keynesian ‘hybrid’ Phillips curve 
performs reasonable well. There is a positive relationship between output and 
inflation and the coefficient of the right-hand-side inflation terms comes close to 
unity. We may therefore conclude that the basic macroeconomic data behave 
equally ‘well’ as they behave in the post-war period. 
 
 
4 Concluding  remarks 
All in all, we may conclude that the 1920s and 1930s does not represent an 
extraordinary episode in term of the fiscal behaviour of governments. Many of the 
basic features are just the same as in the post-war period. Thus we see that deficits 
are sensitive to cyclical movements of output; the size of the (automatic 
stabilisers) effect is roughly comparable to the size of government. Cyclical 
relations appear to be to some extent asymmetric reflecting the basic differences 
between revenues and expenditures. The same features seem to works also the 
most recent data. One way to interpret these results is to say that fiscal policies in 
the 1920s and 1930s were not profoundly different from policies that have been 
pursued later on. More affirmative conclusions would, however, require analysis 
of individual countries. 
 
 
                                                 
7 For further evidence on interest rate behaviour, see Virén (1994)  
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Table 1    Sample average values of key variables 
     for  1925–1938 
 
Country Cdef/Y  Gdef/Y  Debt/Y  ∆y  ∆p:c  ∆p:y 
Argentina -0.03  -1.98  ..  2.61 -1.64 -0.28 
Australia  -3.48  -0.58  85.6  1.65 -1.16 -0.52 
Austria    -0.73  -6.57  27.2 0.20  -1.84 0.25 
Belgium  0.01  -3.50  99.5 1.08 0.67 3.38 
Brazil    -0.73  -1.57  .. 3.26 2.88 2.52 
Bulgaria  -1.80  -1.95  44.3  4.23 -2.22 -3.18 
Canada  0.03  -1.49  62.5  1.34 -1.67 -1.14 
Denmark  -1.11 2.50  21.7  2.50 -2.26 -1.58 
Finland  0.06  -2.40  16.7 4.22 0.52 0.42 
France  -1.02  -2.78  177.6 0.72 2.06 3.85 
Germany  -0.78  -1.41  15.3  4.23 -1.87 -1.35 
Greece -1.53  -1.58  85.3 2.07 1.68 1.75 
Hungary  0.10  -1.60  30.0  2.93 -1.95 -2.04 
Indonesia  ..  -2.72  ..  1.42 -4.57 -5.12 
Italy  -0.26  -7.47  78.8  1.92 -1.92 -0.18 
Japan  -0.51  3.25  41.1 4.10  -0.61 0.49 
Mexico  1.04  0.01  28.3 1.78 1.93 1.07 
Netherlands  -1.99  -5.88  60.2  1.45 -3.28 -1.65 
New Zealand   -0.88  -2.98  ..  2.56  -0.46  .. 
Norway  -0.27  -0.88  35.2  3.68 -3.12 -3.36 
Spain  -0.51  -0.44  62.7 2.41 1.08  -0.85 
Sweden  -0.14  -1.57  22.4  3.43 -1.69 -0.57 
Switzerland  -0.24 0.00  27.0  0.51 -3.40 -1.85 
UK  -0.17 0.74 186.0  2.00 -3.25 -0.41 
USA  -0.76  -1.69  29.7  1.00 -1.62 -4.65 
Yugoslavia 0.42  -5.76  74.4  2.03 -2.09 -0.95 
Mean    -0.61  -1.99  57.0  2.28 -1.15 -0.64 
Cdef/Y denotes the ratio of (central) government current surplus (Cdef) to GDP at current 
market prices (Y). Gdef/Y in turn denotes the ratio of (central) government gross surplus 
(Gdef) to GDP at current market prices. Debt denotes the ratio of (central) government 
debt to GDP at current market prices. ∆y denotes the average growth rate of GDP (at 
constant market prices) and ∆p average inflation in terms the CPI or the GDP deflator 
(denoted by ∆p:c and ∆p:y). Data sources: League of Nations 1927–1944, Maddison 
(1964) and Mitchell (2003).  
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Analyses with gross deficit/GDP ratio 
g   .014 
(1.77)



























































































































Analyses with current deficit/GDP ratio 
g .011 
(1.79)
















































Heteroskedasticity adjusted t-ratios are inside parentheses. Wald denotes the Wald F test 
statistic for the hypothesis that in the threshold model (2) output coefficients are equal. 
The number of observations is 487 for the full sample period 1920–1944 and 338 for the 
short sample period 1925–1938. All estimates (except for the row RE) are GLS panel 
data fixed effects estimates. The estimates on row ‘RE’ are derived from a random effects 
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0.027 2.49  Cdef,  ip,  ∆p 
x is the additional regressor that is either the rate of inflation ∆p or the (lagged) debt/GDP 
level, Debt/Y. y denotes here either the growth rate of GDP, g, or industrial production, 
ip, or the output gap in terms of real GDP, z. Huber denotes Huber’s robust M estimator, 
GG/AB denotes the GMM Arellano-Bond estimator (with first differences) and GLS the 
fixed effects panel estimator. With the GMM/AB estimation, the instrument rank is 11. 
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All estimates are GLS estimates with fixed (cross-section) effects. Output y is in all cases 
measured by the growth rate of industrial production, ip. Wald indicates the F(1,264) test 
statistic for the coefficient restriction: α11 = α12. The number of data points for the full 
sample is 426 and for the shorter time period 288. 
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Table 5    Comparison of revenue and expenditure 












































































































































    0.630 
3185 
0.94 
y is the log(Gross Domestic Product), with the deficit variable it is, however, just 
GDP (not log GDP). ex = log(EXP/P), re = log(Rev/P) and def = Def/P. The 
number of observations for the long sample is 513 and for the short 360. 
Estimates (expect for the two indicated by OLS) are GLS fixed effects panel data 
estimates.  
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Table 6    Comparison of pre-war and post-war parameter 
     estimates 
 
Parameter 1926–1938  1971–2004 
Income elasticity of expenditures (a)     .896  .773 
Income elasticity of revenues (b) 1.132  .984 
Income change effect on deficit (c ) .061  .340 
(a) estimate of θ1 from equation log(Exp/P) = θ0 + θ1log(Y/P). (b) estimate of γ1 
from equation log(Rev/P)  =  γ0 + γ1log(Y/P)
γ (c)  estimate of φ1 from equation 
Def/Y = φ0 + φ1∆log(GDP). The post-war estimates are derived from EU data 
(and apply to 15 EU countries only) and the sample consists of 261 observations. 
All  values are GLS estimates. 
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Table 7    Estimates for the rest of countries 
 
Estimates for small panel with deficit data countries 
 
dummies country 1 p / Cdef 062 . ip 266 . p / Cdef
) 66 . 0 ( ) 70 . 1 (
+ − + =  
 
R2 = 0.12, SEE = 17.92, DW = 2.21, n = 55 




Table 8    Estimates for the Phillip curve and the Fisher 
     equation 
 
Phillips curve estimates 
 
50 , 14 J , 60 . 2 DW , 040 . SEE , 564 . R
) p log( 365 . ) p log( 583 . ) y log( 101 . ) p log(
2
1 t
) 14 . 6 (
1 t
) 80 . 5 (
t
) 82 . 2 (
t
= = = =




Interest rate equation estimates 
 
28 . 6 J , 52 . 1 DW , 87 . 1 SEE , 854 . R
Y / Def 065 . ) y log( 034 . ) p log( 032 . 475 . 34 r
2
t t
) 40 . 2 (
t
) 45 . 8 (
1 t
) 03 . 3 ( ) 45 . 9 (
t
= = = =
− − ∆ − = +
 
r denotes government bond yield and p the CPI. Both equations are estimated by GMM to 
account for expected inflation. Lagged inflation, deficit and debt variables are used as 
instruments.  
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